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Uncertainties and Decision Making 
Yuri M. Ermoliev 
1 Introduction 
With these notes we want to outline some practical and important issues concerning 
decision making under uncertainty and risks. 
Decision making under uncertainty is as old as mankind. Casar crossing the Rubicon 
said "Alea iacta est" (the dice are cast) implying that our decisions are affected by chance. 
Uncertainty is an essential feature for any study directed towards the future. The ten- 
dency in decision making involving uncertainty is to postpone decisions until uncertainties 
are resolved. Unfortunately, uncertainties are inherent in virtually all systems related to 
economics, meteorology, demography, ecology, etc., and will never be resolved. In order 
to encourage a decisionmaker to act we need appropriate tools to explicitly treat the un- 
certainties involved. When effects of decisions become evident only after a considerable 
length of time, the purely adaptive "trial and errors" market mechanisms become ineffi- 
cient and need to be combined with anticipative mechanisms based on models, predictions, 
regulations and verifications. 
Models, Verbal Analysis 
We cannot predict or optimize everything unless we make some assumptions on patterns 
of the phenomena: create a model. Sometime the assumptions are made in an explicit 
form that leads to  mathematical models and a rigorous analysis. Sometime they are 
made implicitly and that leads to a verbal analysis, often providing more questions than 
answers. It is impossible to  rely on such statements as "the market brings to the equi- 
librium demands and pricesn or "adaptation and incremental improvements will find an 
optimal decisionn, since it is true only when underlying processes have certain properties, 
for instance, smoothness, concavity, product homogeneity and divisibility, unchanging 
"environment", full information (certainty), lack of strategic behaviour, absence of exter- 
nalities and increasing return to scale. Otherwise the "convergence" cannot be proved 
even on paper (mathematically) and such mechanisms without the help of a regulatory 
body may create unpredictable behavior and dangerous "locked-in" structures even by 
small disturbances at the initial stage1 as may be the case in the former Soviet Union. 
Uncertainty enters various steps of a model building process, starting from the model 
structure: purely verbal or with some precise details; which variables are driving?; levels of 
aggregation and decomposition (region, country, the universe) coinciding with uncertainty 
of available information; relations between variables, for instance, diffusion equations or 
only simple "predictors" such as the transfer coefficients are needed in the pollution 
'For more information see W.B. Arthur, Yu.M. Ermoliev and Yu.M. Kaniovski Path -dependen t  pro- 
cesses  and  the  emergence  of macro-structure, European Journal of Operations Research, 30 (1987), p.294- 
310. 
management if we take into account uncertainties in the weather conditions, "doses- 
effects" relations, current and projected emission patterns, etc. 
Modeling usually starts with an attempt to create a model which makes sense of 
observable data. From the formal point of view it can be interpreted as an approximation 
of available data by some functions such as polynomial, or other functions which may 
also be given implicitly as solutions of differential equations, or Petry and neural nets 
with unknown parameters to be identified. Since there may be errors of measurements, 
the Ufitness" must be understood also in a certain way that often leads to non unique 
solutions of the identifications procedures and additional uncertainties of predictions. 
3 Decisions, Uncertainties-Searching for Improve- 
ment s 
The existence of decision variables creates additional and essential sources of uncertainties 
in contrast to classical natural science models. The aim of a decision making model is not 
only to make sense of a limited set of observable data, but also the change of the current 
practice and structure for a better state which may be unlike anything we experienced 
in the past. The experiments or "trial and errors" mechanisms may be dangerous, time 
consuming or simply impossible and we have to rely only on models equipped with tools 
to treat arising uncertainties explicitly. 
Goals of a decision making process and constraints create more uncertainties and 
cases when good intentions may lead to bad results and public distrust. Constraints 
induce feedback, for instance, if carbon dioxide of the water C, and carbon dioxide of the 
atmosphere C, satisfy a symbolic constraint (in a time interval) 
oC, + PC, = const 
with some positive coefficients a, p, then the positive feedback occurs: the warming di- 
minishes C, and thus increases C, which leads to more warming, diminishing C, and so 
on. 
Uncertainties in constraints such as in values a, P influence a balance of positive and 
negative multiple feedback and may lead to opposite conclusions, for instance, on warming 
or on the ozone layer. 
It is not true that any other, e.g. verbal, analyses avoids all above mentioned difficul- 
ties: it is only possible by ignoring them. 
Of course, the building of a decision making model (conceptual or more formal, in- 
cluding details such as concrete values o, 0 )  is not only a scientific task but also an art. 
The main purpose is not to take a picture of the situation, but to make a sketch-a lab- 
oratory world to examine possible concepts and alternatives. In the presence of essential 
uncertainties the most important task of the modeling seems to be a search for better 
solutions, comparative studies or optimization rather then prediction and assessment. It 
is impossible to explore all details of the environment, biochemical, hydro-meteorological, 
genetic, etc. differences involving large numbers of variables. Therefore assessments and 
predictions will always yield poor absolute values. Despite this, the preference structure 
among decisions might be stable, which is similar to the difference between measuring 
exact weights of parcels and only guessing which is heavier. 
4 Robust optimal decisions and Scenario Analysis 
The study of interactions between uncertainties, decisions and outcome is a methodolog- 
ically challenging task. Relations among variables may be changed considerably with the 
change of decisions aggravating various risks. It is possible to speak about reliability of a 
decision: the best decision combined with ubad luckn may lead to negative effects, and a 
wrong decision with "good luckn to positive effects-at least for a while, as it was in the 
case of Chernobyl. 
How can we choose decisions which are optimal and still robust against all eventuali- 
ties? For instance, decisions in the case of greenhouse effects which might fundamentally 
endanger modern civilization, but on the other hand might be beneficial or perhaps even 
not big enough to matter2. 
As uncertainty is a broad concept, it is useful to approach it in many different ways3. 
The most commonly used technique, scenario analysis, to deal with long term planning 
under uncertainty is seriously flawed. Although it can identify "optimal" solutions for 
each scenario, it does not provide any idea as to how these uoptimal" solutions should 
be combined to produce merely a reasonable decision. A suggestion to mix the best 
solutions with weights assigned to corresponding scenarios may lead to wrong decisions as 
it can be seen from simplest situations. There is also a suggestion to use mixed strategies 
derived from an appropriate "pay-off" (decision/scenarios) matrix. In this case an optimal 
decision appears as a result of random choice among decisions which are optimal only to 
one scenario (e.g., best crop for "dry", "normaln or uwet" ~ e a s o n ) . ~  Of course, such a 
solution lacks diversity (multiple crops, different energy sources, various products, etc.) 
needed for its robustness against all possible scenarios. 
5 Set-Valued Estimates. Guaranteed Strategies 
One clear and easy way to characterize the uncertainty is by ranges or even sets of possible 
values (without identifying their likelihood): set-valued estimates. Since such a depiction 
of uncertainty does not provide any idea of more reasonable values, the choice of optimal 
decisions is usually based on the calculation of upper and lower bounds of outcomes with 
respect to all possible uncertainties. In particular, it is suggested to make decisions from 
the worst case sit uation-so called guaranteed decisions (strategies). 
In the case of dynamic systems modeled by differential equations guaranteed strategies 
often lead to instabilities and irregular behavior of corresponding trajectories. The absence 
of optimal trajectories in the commonly used sense requires generalization, and it is often 
suggested to describe the state of the system also as a set-valued estimate. Since nonlinear 
transformations of a dynamic system may map a simple set into a rather complicated 
domain, the set-valued estimates of the state are sometimes searched among a rather 
simple approximation, for instance, ellipsoids. 
The characterization of uncertainties by ranges and worst case analysis may provide 
'Clark, W.C. ,  1986, "Policy Procedures on the Carbon Diozide Question: Risk Unceriainfies and 
Eztreme Events", CP-86-26, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 
pp. 287-303. 
3See, for example, Decision analysis and behavioral research, D. von Winderfeld, W .  Edwards, Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1986. 
4 Y ~ r i  Ermoliev, Giinther Fischer, 1993 Spatial Modeling of Resource Allocation and Agriculture Pro- 
duction under Environmental Risk and Uncertainty, IIASA, WP-93-11. 
useful insights. On the other hand, "because5 a range may be derived through a process of 
ruling out impossible values rather then through critical analysis of the relative likelihood 
of more reasonable values this depiction sometimes arouses scepticism and can appear 
non-scientific." 
The following is a typical i l lu~ t ra t ion :~  
Giving only the mean annual income .... or only the median and bounds 
would not reveal that a substantial proportion of the total national income 
accrues to  a relatively small number of very wealthy persons. 
The same applies for concentrations of pollutants or populations, toxicants, energy 
demand for the next year, etc. For instance, a daily concentration of a toxicant may be 
within the normal level, but for five minutes it may vitally exceed the survival level. A 
simplified depiction of the uncertainty by decision makers may easily create a syndrome 
of "public concernn as the following example illustrates. 
Consider a situation where two types of accidents might occur to  a group of ten people. 
The first type of accident will result in the death of all ten persons in one out of ten cases. 
A second type of accident will result in the death of each of the ten persons (independently) 
also in one out of ten cases. The range of possible death (set-valued estimate) and the 
averaged value are the same in both cases, that is 10 and (1/10) 10 = 1. But the chance 
of ten deaths in the second type of accident is only 10-lo = 0.0000000001 in contrast to 
0.1 of the first type. 
Weights, Fuzzy-Sets 
A more general idea to  depict uncertainties is to assign weights to  possible values of 
uncertainties (parameters, events), such as frequencies in the case of repetitive events, 
or confidence measures in the case of non-repetitive events (an accident of a particular 
plant). Such weights are often interpreted as a probabilistic measure (possibly of sub- 
jective nature). There may also be other versions, for instance when the support of the 
weight-function is interpreted as the "Fuzzy setn. 
The difficulty of such an approach is that although the weights of initial data are 
known, their propagation through the system creates enormous computational difficul- 
ties for the analytical evaluation of outcome weights. The decision variables as we can 
see further may dramatically affect these weights and create a higher order source of 
uncertainties. 
The interpretation of weights as a probabilistic measure has essential advantages to  any 
other concepts since the study of the propagation in this case can be based on the Monte 
Carlo simulation techniques. In other words, it is possible to incorporate a Monte Carlo 
simulation model into an optimization process. In addition the probabilistic approach 
enables us to  formalize ideas of learning from observations, ex ante (anticipative) and ex 
post (adaptive) control strategies. Unfortunately it is impossible in other approaches such 
as the Fuzzy-set theory. Besides, in such approaches there is no well established empirical 
method to quantify fuzziness (or vagueness, plausibility) similar to frequencies analysis 
'See Adam M. Finkel "Confronting Uncertainty in Risk Management", Center for Risk Management, 
Resources for the Future, Washington, January 1990, p.28. 
'See Adam M. Finkel, p.XIII. 
of real observations, experiments, results of questionnaires or expert judgements of the 
probability theory. This produces various inconsi~tencies.~ 
How can we design an optimal strategy by utilizing only weights of the initial data? 
7 Stochastic Optimization. Anticipation and Adap- 
t at ion 
The task of the Adaptation and Optimization Project (1982-1 985) a t  IIASA was to  study 
the answers t o  this question. Extended discussions of motivations, developed tools with 
its possible applications and implementations has been published in the volume Yu. 
Ermoliev, R. Wets (Eds.), 1988, "Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Opt imi~at ion~~,  
Springer-Verlag, Computational Mathematics, 10. 
Let us note that the search procedure cannot be based on straightforward Monte Carlo 
simulations since even the evaluation of the best decision among two alternatives in such 
a case is equivalent to well-known problems of hypotheses testing. Since results of initial 
data propagation can be studied (in general) only by a sampling procedure, the above 
question is equivalent to  the following: 
How can we find an optimal decision among an infinite number of feasible 
decisions without calculation of exact values of "objectives" and "constraints" 
and with a large number of decision variables and uncertainties? 
The answer to  this question leads us to stochastic optimization tools conceivable with 
only partially known distribution functions (and incomplete observations of unknown 
parameters), which have been successfully applied to a wide variety of problems. 
There are differences between the typical formulation of the optimization problems 
that come from statistics and those from decision making under uncertainty. Stochastic 
optimization models are mostly motivated by problems arising in so-called "here-and- 
now", or ex ante situations, when decisions must be made on the basis of existing or 
assumed a priori information about uncertainties. The situation is typical for problems 
of long-term planning (strategic behavior) possibly involving irreversibility that arise in 
systems analysis. In mathematical statistics we are mostly dealing with "wait-and-see" , 
or ex post situations when decisions are made on the basis of observations "during" the 
decision making process. Such a situation is encountered in short-term planning or in 
driving a car. 
Two-stage and more general multi-stage models of the stochastic optimization at- 
tempt to  develop an operational framework for the concept of 'now-and-thenn decisions 
incorporating 'here-and-nown strategies with 'wait-and-see" decisions. When effects of 
actions are uncertain and the actions cannot be reversed, the timing of decisions becomes 
important. The choice of anticipative ex-ante decision must be subjected to  how future 
information and learning could change the level of uncertainties and developments. Thus 
multi-stage approaches of the stochastic optimization incorporate classical risk aversion 
and risk seaking concepts. The notion of stage refers to various pre-posterior information 
levels rather then time intervals: each state may consist of some time intervals and we 
can also speak, for example, of two-stage dynamic models. 
Generally speaking, in the case of uncertainties, non-stationarities or disequilibrium 
there are two major mechanisms to  facilitate our response to  uncertainty and changing 
7 ~ . ~ .  Lindley "The Probability Approach to the Treatment of Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 
and Expert Systems", Slaiislical Science 2, 17-24 (1987). 
conditions: the short-term adaptive adjustments (defensive driving, marketing, inventory 
control, emergency service, etc.) and the long-term anticipative actions (engineering 
design, policy setting, investment strategies, insurance, pollution reduction strategies, 
land development, even keeping an umbrella a t  the office, etc.). The anticipative, long- 
term perspectives are important for the environmental problems, since purely adaptive 
market mechanisms are inefficient in such cases. 
The major challenge to  the systems analyst is to develop a "now-and-then" approach 
that combines both mechanisms (adaptive and anticipative) in the presence of a large 
number of uncertainties, and this in such a way that it is computationally tractable. 
Chaotic Behavior 
Dynamics and nonlinearities bring uncertainties of chaotic behavior similar to probabilistic 
and well-known from the pseudo-random numbers generators theory. Again, often the 
famous question arises whether the good plays dice or the nature is certain and can be 
predicted.8 If this is the case, then one may become a very wealthy person by finding a 
deterministic equation describing fluctuations of prices on a stock exchange. How shall we 
characterize uncertainties of the chaotic nature, for instance, sequences of pseudo-random 
numbers-by ranges, trajectories, generating equations or remarkably stable frequences? 
Of course, it depends on the problem at hand. 
9 Externalities, Negotiations 
Decisions create more uncertainties through externalities existing in economics and envi- 
ronment, when results of a participant (firm, region, country) are uncertain until other 
participants reveal their decisions. Such uncertainties require not only exchange of in- 
formation, but a concept of mutual interests and joint constraints which are not always 
understood and may often emerge only through a process of successive negotiations. There 
exists the game theory: theoretical framework with various concepts of possible equilibri- 
ums in the presence of different interests of participants (of cooperative or non-cooperative 
nature). 
The treatment of the environment as this generation's "public good" brings uncer- 
tainties in the evaluation of real costs, benefits or efficiencies. Of course, the round table 
discussion will never produce values of damages and the negotiations must be supple- 
mented by unified approaches to treat involved uncertainties. It is possible to imagine 
a model accepted by participants to serve the purpose of a witness or victim during a 
negotiation process. 
10 Irreversibility, Dynamic Approaches, "Dialogue" 
with Models 
Accumulative effects and irreversibility of environmental damages when values may be lost 
forever accentuate on the long-term and anticipative nature of decisions and require to 
establish "contactsn between the current and the future generations. What are "taxes" of 
the current generation? What are "social" costs and benefits? The answer often calls for a 
'Contradicting even with W. Heisenberg's "uncertainty principle". 
regulatory body (or number of competing authorities) to establish environmental quality 
in certain "normsn with appropriate monitoring regulations, and verification procedures. 
It requires a dynamic approach to the decision making under uncertainty to enable the 
tracing back to the sources of observable episodes. 
A decision making process can easily be directed towards desired results by manipula- 
tions with goals, constraints, parameters, relations between variables, etc. (with model), 
that may lead to contradictory conclusions and public distrust. It is important to under- 
stand that the structure of a decision making model is not as well defined as the structure 
of natural science models. The formulation of such a model always runs into difficulties in 
identifying objectives and constraints. Their understanding and quantification is usually 
achieved through a udialoguen with the model when each run of the model provides new 
ideas of possible variables, constraints and goals. Such process proceeds until a compro- 
mised decision emerges. Therefore, the model doesn't make decisions-they are made by 
the decision maker (participant) and the most important is not "what he decides" but 
"how he decides". 
We can say that in the decision making process nothing can be claimed to be the true 
decision; it varies with changes in goals, alternatives, constraints, information. The whole 
process must be viewed as a process of successive adjustments rather than a comprehensive 
choice. The study of such non-stationary decision making processes is rather challenging. 
Important "adjustments" may not necessarily lead to incremental improvements even in 
the case of concave (or convex) but rapidly changing (non-differentiable) objective (goal) 
function. 
The complexity of the decision making process itself creates additional uncertainties 
and constraints. We can also study the propagation of decisions through the "decision 
events treen, where an event may be "public rejection". 
11 Nonlinearities. Discontinuity of Risk Functions 
The nature of uncertainty avoids certainty so as even the best solution, as mentioned 
above, may have (with bad luck) a negative result. It requires transparent representation 
of scientific understanding of inherent uncertainty, which is often quite different from the 
public and decision maker perception. 
The uncertainty creates easily nonlinearity and even discontinuity, which in turn cre- 
ates new uncertainty. 
In the case of guaranteed strategies, essential uncertainties are created by "inner" 
subproblems which are often not completely solved, and thus the guaranteed results are 
unknown. Sometime this difficulty can be avoided by using nondifferentiable optimization 
techniques that have been a focal point of IIASA's research since the mid 70s. 
Stochastic approaches to the decision making under uncertainty aim to model situa- 
tions of a risk, when each given decision may have both positive or negative results or 
externalities (win or loose, hit or miss, cost or profit, over or under-estimating, etc.). The 
possibility of positive and negative externality for the same solution results in nonlinear- 
ities and even discontinuities of corresponding risk indicators. 
Risk-based environmental management provides a great deal of such examples. We 
can think of a typical "hit or miss" situation, that of reducing accumulative pollutants 
such as greenhouse gases and stratospheric ozone-destroying gases. Such problems are 
characterized by uncertain thresholds, which, if exceeded, may result in drastic losses. 
In this example the discontinuity occurs due to irreversible environmental impacts. 
The presence of risks creates also a discontinuity in a at first glance rather "smooth" 
situation. 
To illustrate this fact by verbal discussion is difficult. Therefore, let us consider a 
simple pollution control model, given by a linear inequality ("safety constraint"): 
where x is a level of the emission; h is a "predictor", which computes the average 
deposition level a t  a receptor point from the unit of the emission. The norm of the "daily" 
depositions equal 2. Such safety constraints are important as a "surrogate indicator" in 
the case, when the evaluation of real damages (costs) is impossible. 
If h is known, then a permitted level of the emission x is defined easily from the 
inequality. Suppose now that h is a random variable which takes only two values 0.5 and 
1 with probability 0.5. Then for any x > 0 there may be two possibilities 
and the simplest indicator to characterize risk to violate the safety constraint is (risk- 
function) 
The graph of this step function is shown in Figure 1. Accumulative effect (increasing 
level of pollution x) results in discontinuous changes which is similar to  so-called "chemical 
time bomb" phenomena.g They are unexpected and uncontrolled unless the rate of change 
is characterized. For instance, in a pollution control problem we might be interested in 
minimizing risk by a process of incremental improvements. Since the marginal value 
(derivatives) of F ( x )  at any x is 0, the search process cannot be based on evaluations 
of these values. How can one characterize the increasing rate of two functions, shown in 
Figure 2 in order to  utilize it in the search of an optimal decision. 
'See Stigliani, W.,  P. Doelman, W. Salomons, R. Schulin, G .  Smidt and S.  van der Zee (1991). 
Chemical Time Bombs: Predicting the Unpredictable, Environment 33:4-9, 26-30. 
Figure 1. Discontinuity of the risk function. The  marginal value of the function is 0 but 
the risk increases with increasing x. Accumulative effect results in rapid and sudden 
changes. 
Figure 2. What is the rate of increase of two functions. 
We can imagine now possible nonlinearities and discontinuities of a similar risk function 
defined for the case n emittors: 
where hl , ..., hn are random predictors (for each emittor i = 1, ..., n);  xl , ..., xn-levels of 
emission; q is the norm (critical load). 
The discontinuity of F (x )  creates the uncertainty of the change or in the indication 
of improvements. In addition there are critical uncertainties in the evaluation of the risk 
indicator F (x )  as a function of x. The choice of a decision x may dramatically affect 
the value F(x) :  let us compare decisions x = (1,0, ..., 0) and x = (1,1, ..., 1). Although 
uncertainties in the initial data (predictors) h l ,  ..., h, are characterized by probabilistic 
measures, the probability of an outcome 
as a function x is evaluated exactly only in exceptional cases (especially for more general 
risk indicators involving "damagesn). 
The fundamental problem in the design of an optimal strategy is to bypass the above 
mentioned discontinuities, uncertainties of the change and the evaluation of exact values 
of functions similar to F(x) ,  in general involving also costs, benefits, damages, etc. 
Within the stochastic optimization framework such search technique is developing for 
problems with large numbers of decisions variables and uncertainties, practically arbitrary 
"distributionsn and rather general "objectivesn and "constraints". The technique is es- 
sentially based on using only random observations of risk functions through Monte Carlo 
simulations or actual measurements. 
Enforcement and Education 
A more rigorous and explicit formulation of assumptions may be a great advantage for 
decision making, even if uncertainty exists in the model. But policy formation is a com- 
plicated process that involves political pressure, self-interest and the interest of various 
groups. The reluctance to reach firm1' conclusions enables a policy maker to use research 
as to support or justify a pre-determined decision. Background and educational train- 
ing is also important. Decision makers usually have difficulties assessing variable results 
and often only simple estimates and indicators are encouraged, which are often sources 
of public concern and distrust. For instance, such indicators as "life expectancyn and 
"collective dosen or "concentration leveln alone are not able to dipict variations of effects 
within a population or country. What are enforcements for using more adequate data in 
order to choose "fairn decisions? Of course, such a question can only be answered on a 
case by case basis. 
'Osee C. G.  Miller "Cases in the applications of air quality models in policy making", pp. 23-24 in the 
Proceedings of an October 1979 IIASA Workshop on "Mathematical models for planning and controlling 
air quality", Pergamon Press. 
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